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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
JAMES RONALD BELLO,

Case No. 920830 CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Amendment IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall

any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 14:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated;
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized.
INTRODUCTION
The Briefs of Appellant and Appellee have been filed in this Court. Pursuant to
Rules 24 and 26, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant ("Bello") files this Reply
Brief in response to the Appellee's Brief, which contains inaccurate facts.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The facts in the instant case have been previously addressed by Bello in his opening
brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BELLO CHALLENGES THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS BELOW
AND IN THIS COURT; THUS, THE ISSUE OF ADEQUACY OF THE
DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS IS PRESERVED FOR APPELLATE
REVIEW.
After chronicling the district court's factual findings, the State contends: "Based on
the above findings of fact, which defendant does not contest, the court denied defendant's
-2-

motion to suppress." Br. of Appellee at 5. To the extent the State asserts that Bello did
not contest the district court's findings either below or in this Court, the assertion is clearly
not supported by the record. First, Bello filed a motion to reconsider, urging the district
court to augment its findings and conclusions because they are inadequate and erroneous.
See R. 102, 126. In addition, considerable portion of Bello's Brief to this Court was
devoted to contesting the district court's findings and conclusions.

See, e.g., Br. of

Appellant at 9-13. Thus, contrary to the State's assertion, it is clear that Bello challenges
the district court findings and preserves the question of adequacy of those findings for
appellate review.
POINT II
BELLO DID NOT WAIVE HIS CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM THAT THE
SEARCH VIOLATED ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
The State argues that Bello fails to advocate why the search and seizure of his
vehicle independently violated article 1, section 14, of the Utah Constitution.

Br. of

Appellee at 7. Consequently, the State contends that "defendant's constitutional claims
should be deemed waived." Id. at 8.
As the State acknowledged, however, Bello "assertfed below] that the search of his
truck failed to meet state constitutional requirements for warrantless vehicle searches set
forth in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 467-68 (Utah 1990) (plurality)." Br. of Appellee at

-3-

8. Consequently, this is not a case "where a defendant fails to assert a particular ground
for suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court," State v. Carter, 707 P.2d
656, 660 (Utah 1985), or where an appellant attempts to raise a constitutional issue for the
first time on appeal, see State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Indeed, Bello articulated to the district court that the warrantless search of his truck
violated the state constitution as set forth in Larocco. See Memorandum In Support of
Motion to Suppress, R. 27, at 14-16 (attached to this Reply Brief as Addendum IV).
Further, when the State and the district court failed to respond or consider his state
constitutional argument, Bello moved the district court to reconsider its sketchy findings
and conclusions in light of his Laracco-based state constitutional argument and other then
recently decided cases. See Memorandum In Support of Motion to Reconsider, R. 126, at
5-6 (attached to this Reply Brief as Addendum V).
The State, in arguing that Bello does not advocate why article 1, section 14, should
be read differently from the fourth amendment, clearly ignores Larocco and the principle
of stare decisis. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993). Precluding the
kind of revanchist argument forwarded by the State in this case, the Larocco court held:
The time has come for this court, in applying an automobile exception to the
warrant requirement of article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, to try to
simplify, if possible, the search and seizure rules so that they can be more easily
followed by the police and the courts and, at the same time, provide the public with
consistent and predictable protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
This can be accomplished by eliminating some of the confusing exceptions to the
warrant requirement that have been developed by federal law in recent years. . . .
-4-

Specifically, this court will continue to use the concept of expectation of privacy as
a suitable threshold criterion for determining whether article I, section is applicable.
Then if article I, section 14 applies, warrantless searches will be permitted only if
they satisfy their traditional justification, namely to protect the safety of police or
the public or to protect the destruction of evidence.
Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469-70. If stare decisis has any meaning, it is for the proposition that
"the outcome of an appeal presenting a particular legal question [s]hould be dependent
more on . . . whether the issue has been previously addressed and decided by [a higher]
court." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1269. The question whether article 1, section 14, provides
broader protection than the Fourth Amendment has been addressed and decided by the
Utah Supreme Court. See Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469. Thus, it is clear that the State engages
in circular reasoning and callously disregards stare decisis by claiming that the "trial court
upheld the warrantless vehicle search based on defendant's voluntary search [sic] consent
and thus declined to consider defendant's Larocco argument." Br. of Appellee at 8. As the
Larocco decision makes clear, the trial court may not ignore the pivotal question under
article 1, section 14, namely, whether there were exigent circumstances precluding the
officer from obtaining a warrant to search a vehicle. See Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469-70.
In addition, in his Brief to this Court, Bello not only asserts that article 1, section
14's unique history compels a different result than the fourth amendment.

He also

suggested how and why, under our federal system of government, the state constitutional

-5-

provision should be read differently than the fourth amendment.1 Bello then urged this
Court to look to the Larocco decision for guidance in defining the scope of article 1,
section 14 relative to warrantless vehicle searches. In short, the format employed by Bello
in his appellate brief mirrored that suggested by the Utah Supreme Court and a panel of
this Court. See generally State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986) (referring to scholar
and cases that have employed similar analytical techniques in state constitutional advocacy);
State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (providing framework for state
constitutional advocacy).
CONCLUSION
Bello urges this Court to consider his argument that article 1, section 14, of the Utah
Constitution independently mandate that the warrantless vehicle search conducted in this
case should have been suppressed by the district court
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of July, 1993.
RONALD J. YENGICH
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
HAKEEM ISHOLA
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

1

Bello need not have made these arguments because the Larocco decision clearly
departed from federal law and signifies the independence of article 1, section 14 from the
fourth amendment. See Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469-70.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Reply Brief of Appellant, this

day of July, 1993, to Janet C. Graham, Utah Attorney

General, Marian Decker, Assistant Attorney General, 235 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah, 84114.
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COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

SEVIER COUNTY,
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No.
JAMES RONALD BELLO,

qi-frpri

Defendant.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On

March

5thf

1991,

at

approximately

11:15

a.m.,

Trooper Phil Barney observed defendant's eastbound pickup truck
temporarily straddling the lane marker dividing the inside and
outside eastbound lanes of traffic. He followed the truck for
approximately two miles, during which time he observed no other
unusual driving pattern. At that time, the trooper decided to
pull the truck over even though he acknowledged that the extreme
wind conditions present that day could have been the reason for
the temporary straddling of the lanes. However, he indicated that
he just wanted to check it out.
Trooper Barney then approached the truck, which had
California

plates,

and

demanded

a

driver's

license

and

registration, both of which defendant produced. When the trooper

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence
State v. Bellor Case No. 911000154 FS
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noted

that

the

truck

was

registered

to someone

other

than

defendant, defendant explained that the owner of the truck was
his boss in California. It was apparently at about this point
that the trooper started getting "faint whiffs" of marijuana. He
also observed that defendant appeared to be nervous and shaky.
The trooper started writing a citation for weaving but
became convinced that the truck contained marijuana.

It was at

this point that the trooper decided that he clearly was not going
to let defendant

leave the scene without

first conducting a

search of the truck. He then began asking for consent to search
although the video tape made clear the fact that the

officer was

going to search and that defendant was in custody.
Ultimately, the trooper discovered a large amount of
marijuana
arrested

in the underside of the pickup bed. Defendant was
and

charged with Possession

of Marijuana, a second

degree felony.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INITIAL TRAFFIC STOP WAS UNREASONABLE
AND A PRETEXT FOR AN INVESTIGATION INTO
MATTERS UNRELATED TO THE STOP.
2
The Utah Court of Appeals, in State v. Sierra, has
concluded that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

This fact was clearly demonstrated by the video tape that was
made with relation to this stop.
2

754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App. 1988).

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence
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States

Constitution

unreasonable

or

prohibit

pretextual

the

State

traffic

from

stop

as

employing
a

means

an
for

Thusf Trooper Barney1s

investigating occupants of an automobile.

stop of the truck can be constitutionally justified on one of two
alternative grounds:

First, it could be based on specific,

articulable facts, which together with rational inferences drawn
from those facts, would lead a reasonable person to conclude
defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime. Second,
the stop could be incident to a lawful citation for straddling
the lanes.
Anything less would
invite intrusions upon
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on
nothing more substantial than inarticulate
hunches, a result the United States Supreme
Court has consistently refused to sanction.
A.
REASONABLE SUSPICION
For

a

motor

vehicle

stop

to

comply

with

constitutionally required reasonable suspicion, the "trial courts
are

required

to

consider

the

totality

of

the

confronting the officer at the time of the seizure."
In

Sierra, the court found that a traffic stop to cite

the defendant
pretext

for

circumstances
5

for following too close was unreasonable and a
a

further

investigation.

The

court

based

3

See also State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989).

4

Sierra, 754 P.2d at 975.

5

id., at 975.

this

<u

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence
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decision

on

defendant.

two

circumstances

surrounding

the

stop

of

the

The first involved the officer's misapplication of

the statute that prohibited a vehicle from driving in the left
lane on the freeway. The officer who made the stop told the
driver that he was obligated to pull to the right immediately
after passing another vehicle. The statute relied upon by the
officer in fact required that a driver move to the right lane as
soon as practical. Based on the officer's misinterpretation of
the statute and the lack of a complete record on the driving
pattern, the court was unable to conclude that the defendant had
7
in fact violated the law.
Even more important

to the court was the officer's

actions preceding the stop for the traffic violation. The court
found that the officer was suspicious of the defendant before he
observed any traffic violation. The officer, prior to making the
stop, had called for a check on the vehicle's license plate to
determine if the vehicle was stolen. Backup assistance had been
called for before the stop, and the officer had to exceed the
speed limit in order to catch up with the defendant.
After reviewing the facts under the totality of the
circumstances, the court concluded that defendant's nervousness
was

not

inconsistent

with

innocent

behavior

and

that

the

officer's decision to stop his car "was based on nothing more
See id.
7

See id. at 979.

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence
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than

an unconstitutional

hunch"

that defendant

was

carrying

o

narcotics.
In the instant case, Trooper Barney stopped the truck
allegedly

for

acknowledged

temporarily straddling
that

responsible

for

the
the

extreme

canyon

straddling.

the lanes. Hef
winds

Defendant

could
submits

however,
have been
that

the

trooper had no reason whatsoever to stop him after following the
truck

for

approximately

two

miles

without

observing

any

straddling or unusual driving pattern.
The

only

reported

explanation

for

the

trooper's

questioning of defendant from this point on was the fact that the
truck had California license plates and its occupant appeared
9
nervous.

Thus, without having a legitimate reason for being

there at that point, the trooper proceeded to question and then
search. The trooper's failure to allow defendant to proceed was
clearly to further investigate him for possible crimes unrelated
to the

initial stop. Moreover, it is important to point out that

the trooper did not once question the defendant regarding the
temporary

straddling,

his

purported

concern

for

initially

Ld. at 976. See also State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah
1987)(Mexican appearance, out of state license plates and
nervousness do not constitute reasonable suspicion); United
States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985)(Spanish
appearance, out of state license plates and sole concern that
defendant was transporting narcotics does not justify a Terry
stop).
9
The video tape of Mr. Bello does not confirm this observation
of the officer.

3/

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence
State v. Bello, Case No. 911000154 FS
Page 6

stopping

the truck. Rather,

like the officer

in Sierrar

the

trooper requested a backup and subsequently checked defendant's
criminal records and conducted a search of the truck. It is clear
that the stop at this point had become a pretext for something
else.10
In State v. Baird,

the Court of Appeals was faced

with facts quite similar to those in the instant case. In Baird,
a highway patrolman was parked in a median on Interstate 15 near
Moab, for the purpose of checking the speed of passing cars with
a radar unit. As he sat in his vehicle the patrolman observed a
late model cadillac approaching at 56 miles per hour. The car had
Arizona license plates that somehow did not appear to the officer
to be valid. The patrolman was unaware of Arizona's color scheme
for determining sticker validity.
Nevertheless, the officer followed the car and then
stopped it purportedly to check out the sticker's validity. As he
approached
detected

the
the

vehicle,
odor

of

the

officer,

marijuana.

After

among

other

things,

discovering

through

dispatch that the driver had a suspended driver's license, the
officer arrested him and had the car towed to Nephi and searched

u

Compare the instant case with State v, Marshall, 791 P.2d 880
(Utah
Ct.App.
1990)
(stop
of
defendant's
vehicle
for
malfunctioning turn signal was a pretext).
11

763 P.2d 1214 (Utah Ct.App. 1988).

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence
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without the owner's consent. The search resulted in the discovery
of 165 pounds of marijuana in the trunk.
The court accorded no weight to the officer's detection
of odor of marijuana after finding the initial stop pretextual.
It went on to find that:
[t]he officer articulated "something just
struck me funny about i f referring to the
license plate sticker. Alone this does not
approach
reasonable
and
articulable
suspicion. The state attempted to justify the
stop by the after-discovered evidence...While
this may have justified a further inquiry of
the driver
after
a valid
stop, such
articulable suspicion must be present at the
time of the stop.
In the

instant

the

he had

reasonable

driving

believe

that the driver of the truck was engaged in or about to
in criminal

driver's

no

trooper observed no

unusual

engage

pattern,

case, once

activity. Therefore, his

window

and

demand

Further, unlike

the

officer

for

approach

identification

in Baird,

the

suspicion

to

to the

was unlawful.

trooper

did

not

discover any incriminating evidence pursuant to the NCIC check.
Defendant's

license

was valid

and

the

truck had

not been

reported stolen. Moreover, defendant's apparent nervousness and
the fact that the trooper detected the odor of marijuana are not
enough to justify further inquiry.13 Based on the foregoing,

Id. at 1216-17 (emphasis added and footnote ommitted).
13
See id.: see generally Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1137
(nervousness not ground to support reasonable suspicion);
Mendoza, 748 P.2d at 184 (same); Sierra, 754 P.2d at 976 (same).

2'

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence
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defendant submits that all evidence seized from the unlawful
search and seizure should be suppressed.
B.
STOP INCIDENT TO TRAFFIC VIOLATION
A police officer may constitutionally stop a vehicle
for a traffic violation committed in his or her presence.14 The
officer

may

not, however, use

a misdemeanor

violation

as a

springboard for launching a full scale search of such vehicle
without probable cause. 15
A trial court determines whether a stop for a traffic
violation and the subsequent search of a vehicle and its occupant
were pretextual by looking objectively at the officer's action
under the totality of the circumstances. In the instant case, the
test is whether a reasonable officer, under the totality of the
circumstances, would

have

stopped

the

truck

for

temporarily

straddling the lanes, even after the hypothetical officer had
observed no straddling or any unusual driving pattern for two
miles and had acknowledged that the temporary straddling could
have been caused by powerful canyon winds.

Defendant submits

that this inquiry must be answered in the negative. This is so
because the trooper had no reason not to allow defendant to

State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1984).
15

Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977; State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah
Ct.App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990).
16

See Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977.

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence
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proceed

at

the

point

when

he

observed

no

citable

traffic

violation.
In Arroyo, the court emphasized the arresting officer's
investigative actions preceding the traffic stop in finding a
pretext stop. The defendant was driving on Interstate 15 and was
stopped by an off duty highway patrol trooper. The defendant was
observed

traveling

at

approximately

fifty

miles

per

hour

following another vehicle at a distance of three to eight car
lengths. The trooper, who was traveling in the opposite direction
of the defendant's vehicle, had to make a U-turn through the
freeway median. He did not immediately stop the defendant, but
pulled alongside him and noticed that the defendant was Hispanic
and the vehicle had out of state license plates. The trooper then
pulled back and stopped the defendant. The purpose of the stop
was to cite the defendant

for following

another vehicle too

closely. The court noted that very few citations are issued for
that offense. The court concluded

its analysis of the pretext

issue, stating:
We are persuaded that a reasonable officer
would not have stopped Arroyo and cited him
for 'following too closely' except for some
unarticulated
suspicion of more serious
criminal activity.

Arroyo, 770 P.2d at 155; see also Sierra, 754 P.2d at 979 ("We
are persuaded that a reasonable officer would not have stopped
Sierra's car and issued a warning citation for travelling in the
left lane but for his desire to [conduct further criminal
investigation].").

? c

Defendants Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence
State v. Bello, Case No. 911000154 FS
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The

facts

and

circumstances

in

the

instant

case

indicate that Trooper Barney's motivation for stopping the truck
was investigatory. Even if his initial reason for wanting to stop
the truck was legitimate, his intention to search for evidence of
crimes

became

obvious

when

he

continued

on

despite

his

observation, for two miles, of no unusual driving pattern.
Although the trooper purportedly stopped the truck for
straddling or weaving, he never checked to find out the reason
for the straddling, apparently because he knew the winds were
primarily responsible. Thus, his actions were more unreasonable
than the officers' actions in Arroyo, Sierra, and Mendoza, which
the court found impermissible under the Fourth Amendment. While
the

officer

initially
lefthand

therein

for

could

"following

lanes,"

such

too

for

temporarily

stopping

closely,"

justification

trooper herein, because most
drivers

justify

was

or

the
"for

defendants
staying

unavailable

to

in
the

reasonable officers do not stop

straddling

lanes, particularly under
extreme canyon winds as in the instant case,18 and where there is
another reasonable explanation for the driving pattern.
Defendant therefore submits that a reasonable officer

would not have stopped and questioned him for straddling. The
actions of the trooper clearly demonstrate a pretextual traffic
stop and/or detention
18

to conduct

a further

investigation for

See, e.g.. United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir.
1986)(stop of defendant's car for weaving was pretext to conduct
warrantless search).

Defendants Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence
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evidence of possible crimes. Even if the trooper had reasonable
grounds for initially stopping the truck, the reasonableness of
the

stop

would

have

ended when

defendant

produced

a valid

registration and license. Moreover, all of the trooper's actions
were consistent with an investigative motive. The stop of the
truck was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The
fact that the trooper subsequently detected the odor of marijuana
19
does not validate the pretextual stop.
Therefore, defendant
requests this court to suppress the evidence seized as a result
of the stop and subsequent searches.
POINT II
THE SEARCH CONDUCTED BY THE TROOPER EXCEEDED
THE SCOPE OF DEFENDANT'S CONSENT.
"Even

when

a

defendant

voluntarily

consents

to

a

search, the ensuing search must be limited in scope to only the
specific area agreed to by defendant."20 In the instant case,
defendant consented to the search of the cabin portion of the
truck.

Having

found

nothing

therein,

the

trooper

ordered

defendant to open up the truck bed and proceeded to conduct a
full

scale

"transcendted]

search.
the

Defendant

actual

scope

submits
of

the

that

consent
21
encroaches on [his] Fourth Amendment rights."

the

search

given

[and]

See supra text accompanying note 11; Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688.
State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 888 (Utah Ct.App. 1990).
United States v. Gary. 774 F.2d 368, 377 (10th Cir. 1985).
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POINT III
DEFENDANT'S CONSENT WAS INVALID BECAUSE IT
WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY ATTENUATED FROM THE
ILLEGAL STOP.
The Utah Supreme Court has concluded that a consent
search

made

following

illegal

police

conduct

can

be

constitutionally valid only if it is non-coerced and not arrived
22
at by exploitation of the primary police illegality.

Assuming

that defendant's consent in the instant case was non-coerced,
evidence seized from him must nevertheless be suppressed because
23
the consent was the fruit of an illegal stop.
To determine whether consent was obtained as a result
of an exploitation of prior police illegality, the Supreme Court
has counselled trial courts to examine several factors, including
the temporal proximity of the illegality and the consent, the
presence of intervening circumstances, the flagrancy
illegality, and whether defendant was Mirandized.24

of

the

TEMPORAL PROXIMITY OF STOP AND CONSENT
Defendant's consent occurred immediately after Trooper
Barney pretextually stopped him for weaving. In Sims, where, as
here, the trooper obtained a consent "in a very short time span"
" See State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 689-91 (Utah 1990); State
v. Sims, 156 Utah Adv.Rep. 8, 13 (Ct.App. 1991).
23
See sources cited supra note 21; State v. Carter, 156 Utah
Adv.Rep. 17, 21 (Ct.App. 1991).
See Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690-91 and n. 4; see also Sims, 156
Utah Adv.Rep. at 13-14.
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or

"within

concluded

minutes"

that

there

after

an

illegal

was

not "enough
relationship between the two." 25

roadblock,
time

the

court

to attenuate the

INTERVENING CIRCUMSTANCES

chain

As in Sims, defendant's consent "arose from an unbroken
26
of events that began with the illegal [stop]."
The

trooper

stopped

registration,
consent.

defendant,

detected

"Nothing

an

asked
odor

of

him

for

his

marijuana,

occurred which could have

license

and

asked

and
for

reasonably made

[defendant] feel free to proceed on his journey at any time
between the moment of the stop and the discoveries that prompted
the trooper's request for consent to search [the truck]." 27
FLAGRANCY OF THE ILLEGALITY
Defendant submits that the stop in the instant case was
an unconstitutional stop and not one conducted to serve good
purposes.28 As earlier argued, Trooper Barney stopped defendant
solely to conduct investigations unrelated to traffic violation.
25
Sims. Utah Adv.Rep. at 14 (footnote ommitted); see also Brown
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975) (interval of two hours
insufficient to attenuate prior police misconduct).
26
Sims, at 14.
27
Id.: see also Carter, 156 Utah Adv.Rep. at 17 (no intervening
circumstances between illegal detention and consent).
28
In Sims, the Court of Appeals cautioned police officers
against employing limitless zeal in the effort to thwart illegal
drug trafficking. That an officer has a "Max 25" nose for
detecting narcotics does not justify a pretextual stop based on a
claim, as here, that the driver straddled the lanes. See Sims,
156 Utah Adv.Rep. 8, n. 1.

Z4
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He

had

no

articulable

reason

for not

allowing

defendant

to

proceed on his journey after observing no unusual driving pattern
and

after defendant

had produced

a valid

license. Thusf

the

trooper's conduct was flagrant and indefensible.
MIRANDA WARNING
It is undisputed that the trooper Mirandized defendant
in the

instant

case ex post

facto. The trooper had already

obtained defendant's consent and conducted a thorough search of
the truck before giving him Miranda warnings.
Based on the foregoing, this court should suppress the
evidence seized from defendant because the searches which exposed
the

marijuana,

even

if

consensual,

were

not

sufficiently

attenuated to be purged of the prior illegal stop made by the
trooper.
POINT IV
THE WARRANTLESS AUTOMOBILE SEARCH CONDUCTED
BY TROOPER BARNEY IS PER SE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BECAUSE IT LACKED
REASONABLE
SUSPICION AND THERE WAS NO
EMERGENCY
PREVENTING
THE
TROOPER
FROM
OBTAINING A WARRANT.
In State v. Larocco,

the Utah Supreme Court departed

from confusing Federal automobile search and seizure case law.
The Court concluded that warrantless automobile searches are per
se unconstitutional unless the police have probable
believe

that

the automobile

794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990).

contained

contraband

cause to

and exigent
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circumstances require that the automobile be searched before a
warrant can be obtained. 30
In the instant case, defendant has demonstrated that
the

trooper

lacked

probable

cause

to

stop

him.

The

Utah

legislature does not authorize indiscriminate stop of individuals
and motor vehicles within the State. A citizen or vehicle can be
. . 31
briefly stopped only if the officer has reasonable suspicion.
Under

the

facts

here, mere

hunch

that

defendant

possessed

marijuana in the truck is insufficient to satisfy the required
probable cause or reasonable suspicion.32 The officer did not
observe any unusual driving pattern as to have the requisite
suspicion.
Furthermore, there was no exigent circumstance under
the facts of the instant case. The officer could have obtained a
warrant

to search

the truck

after he detected

the odor of

marijuana. In fact, the officer could have obtained a telephonic
warrant pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 77-23-4(2)(1953, as
amended). Rather than obtaining a warrant, the trooper conducted
a

full

scale

search

of

the

truck,

thereby

usurping

the

magistrate's traditional function of determining whether probable

See id. at 470.
31

See Sims, 156 Utah Adv.Rep. at 12. Coles, 674 P.2d at 199
(police may stop a vehicle only for traffic violation committed
in their presence).
32
See text accompanying supra note 8.
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cause to search existed. 33
Because defendant's truck was searched without consent
and

the

trooper

lacked

reasonable

suspicion

and

was

not

confronted with any exigencies, the evidence seized pursuant to
the search must be suppressed as violative of Article If Section
14 of the Utah Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The stop of defendant's truck for weaving was a pretext
to

conduct

investigation

unrelated

to

the

alleged

traffic

violation. Therefore, evidence seized from him must be suppressed
pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because there
was insufficient attenuation between the stop and the consent to
purge the taint of the prior illegality.
Furthermore,
Constitution

compels

Article

1,

suppression of

Section

14

of

the evidence

the

Utah

seized from

defendant because the warrantless searches were conducted without
reasonable suspicion and there were no exigent circumstances to
justify an exception to the warrant requirement.
DATED this

*^l

day o£Jteywl991.

RONAI
Attorney for Defendant
33
See Sims, at 12. ("In the usual non-exigent circumstances
search and seizure scenario, the judicial branch, through a
magistrate, serves as the neutral authority that issues or denies
a warrant to perform a search and seizure.")
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress
Evidence was mailed/delivered
Attorney,

at

84701, this

the

Sevier

to R. Don Brown, Sevier County

County

Courthouse,

Richfield,

Utah,

2 - ^ day of May, 1991.
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ADDENDUM V

RONALD J. YENGICH, #3580
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant
175 East 400 South
Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES RONALD BELLO,
Defendant.

]
|
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|
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

|

Case No. 911000154 FS

]

Judge Don V. Tibbs

Defendant James Ronald Bello, by and through his attorney
of

record,

Ronald

J.

Yengich, hereby

submits

the

following

memorandum in support of his motion to reconsider the denial of his
Motion to Suppress.
INTRODUCTION
On September 23, 1991, this Court issued its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law denying defendant's Motion to Suppress.
Subsequent to this Court's decision, the Utah Court of Appeals, on
January 30, 1992, decided the case of State v. Godina-Luna, 179
Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (Ct. App. 1992).

In Godina-Luna, which involved

facts similar to those in the instant case, the court affirmed the

lower court decision granting the defendant's motion to suppress
evidence.

In light of Godina-Luna and the following argument,

defendant believes this Court should reconsider its decision of
September 23, 1991.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS IN LIGHT OF STATE v. GODINA-LUNA.
A. State v. Godina-Luna
In Godina-Luna, the officer observed the defendant's car
weaving in and out of traffic lanes.

Suspecting the driver might

be intoxicated, the officer pulled the vehicle over.

After

stopping the vehicle, he concluded that the defendants, the driver
and passenger, were not in fact intoxicated.

However, because the

defendants were nervous, the officer demanded their identification,
which they promptly produced.

He then conducted an NCIC check,

which turned out negative. Thereafter, he asked the defendants if
they had firearms or narcotics in the vehicle.

One defendant

answered "No, [but] if you'd like to check, go ahead.'1 The ensuing
search revealed four kilograms of cocaine.
The defendants then moved to suppress the evidence,
alleging that the stop was pretextual and that the consent was
invalid because it was obtained in exploitation of the illegal
- 2 -

stop.
that

The trial court found the stop legitimate, but concluded
the officer

exceeded

the scope of

his authority

after

discovering that the defendants were not intoxicated.
On appeal the issue was (1) whether the officer had
reasonable suspicion to further detain and question the defendants
after discovering they were in fact sober, and (2) whether the
consent was involuntary and tainted by the illegal detention. The
Court of Appeals held that M[o]nce the reasons for the initial stop
have been satisfied, the individual must be allowed to proceed on
his or her way."

Godina-Luna, 179 UAR at 23.

Any further

detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion.

That the

defendants were nervous or took a less than direct route to their
destination did not justify further detention, the court concluded.
"Although the deputy's hunch ultimately proved to be correct, a
hunch, without more, does not raise a reasonable articulable
suspicion regardless of the final result."

Id.

The court then went on to find that the consent to search
was a product of prior illegality and therefore invalid under the
authority of State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990).
Godina v. Luna, 179 UAR at 23.

- 3-

See

B.
1.

This Court's Conclusions of Law is
Inadequate in Light of Godina-Luna

The instant case is very similar to Godina-Luna.1

Once Trooper Barney had verified defendant's identification and had
determined that he was sober and that the weaving was caused by
high canyon winds, he had no reason to further detain and question
defendant. Thus, this Court should reconsider its legal conclusion
and hold that even if the initial stop was valid, there was no
justification for further detaining defendant.
2.

In addition, the Court should reconsider its legal

conclusion, at page 3, that "[t]he defendant voluntarily consented
to the search and there is no evidence of coercion."

That consent

was voluntarily given and obtained without coercion does not
conclusively establish its constitutionality. "The State must show
the consent was (1) voluntary and (2) not obtained by exploitation
of prior illegality."

Godina-Luna, 179 UAR at 23.

Defendant argued at length in his suppression memorandum
that his so-called consent was obtained in exploitation of the
prior illegal stop and detention. Neither the state nor this Court
specifically address that issue. In light of Godina-Luna and other

1

However, unlike the defendants in Godina-Luna, defendant here
continues to maintain that the initial stop of his vehicle was
pretextual.
- 4 -

cases

cited by defendant, this Court should

re-evaluate its

conclusion and determine whether defendant's consent was a fruit of
prior police misconduct.
POINT II
THE COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW SIMILARLY OVERLOOKED STATE
v. LAROCCO'S HOLDING THAT THE STATE CONSTITUTION
INDEPENDENTLY REQUIRE THAT A VEHICLE SEARCH MUST BE
PRECEDED BOTH BY REASONABLE SUSPICION AND EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES.
Defendant contended

that the search of his vehicle

violated Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution in that it
lacked probable cause and exigent circumstances, as required by
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d

460

(Utah 1990).

callously disregarded defendant's argument.

The State has

This Court similarly

has made no factual finding or legal conclusion regarding that
particular issue.

Because " [t]he constitutionality of a police

officer's detention and search of an individual's automobile turns
on . . . specific[s]," the findings of fact and legal conclusion
must address all relevant issues. See Godina-Luna, 179 UAR at 22.
Defendant therefore urges this Court to reconsider its decision and
make a complete findings of fact and conclusions of law.2

2

Defendant also requests the Court to reconsider its conclusion
that United States v. Bostick, 49 Cr. L. 2270 (S. Ct. 1991),
somehow authorizes law enforcement officers to rampantly detain
citizens, question them and obtain consent to search. The Supreme
Court recently denied certiorari in a case originating from Utah,
- 5 -

ir^t

CONCLUSION
Defendant

urges

this

Court

to

reconsider

its

order

denying his motion to suppress in light of the recent case of
Godina-Luna.3
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this S - O

day of February, 1992.

RONALD J. YENGIC
Attorney for Def^ndan

United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1991), on
rehearing, 941 F.2d 1086 (10th Cir. 1991). In Walker, the Tenth
Circuit clearly rejected the argument that appellate courts have
"consistently recognized the appropriateness of a request to search
made by a police officer during a valid traffic stop, without a
requirement of independent justification for the request."
933
F.2d at 816. The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court has
allowed the police in "certain limited circumstances" to stop
motorists and ask questions without any individualized suspicion of
criminality. See, e.g., Michigan v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990)
(the roadblock case). It concluded, however, that the police may
not stop a motorist for a traffic violation and then question him
or her and obtain consent to search, unless the government can show
that the police have no unfettered discretion "to detain some
individuals and to let others go. . . ." Walker, 941 F.2d at 108789.
The instant case, which is factually similar to Godina-Luna
and Walker,, did not involve a roadblock conducted pursuant to State
law.
Thus, it was constitutionally impermissible for Trooper
Barney to detain defendant, question him and obtain consent to
search, absent a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. This
Court's application of the Bostick case to the instant case is,
therefore, erroneous and merited reconsideration.
Also attached is the District Court opinion in United States
of America v. Beltran, U.S.D.Ct. 91 CR-249 J.
- 6 -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Denial
of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, postage prepaid, this 2Lft day
of February, 1992, to R. Don Brown, Sevier County Attorney, at 250
North Main, Richfield, Utah, 84701.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
|

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

' - » . . - . _ .

i
I

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

i

Case No. 91-CR-249J

vs.
JESUS BELTRAN AND ARTURO
BELTRAN,
Defendants.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Court heard evidence and argument on defendants' Motion to
Suppress on January 24, 1992.

In their Memorandum in Support of

the Motion to Suppress and at the evidentiary hearing, defendants
contended that the Court should suppress all the evidence seized
from the November 20, 1991, search of the defendants' rented U-Haul
truck, basing their contention on four main arguments.

First,

defendants assert that the continued detention of the defendants'
by Trooper Curtis Dean Shields ("Shields11) for purposes of having
defendants
pretextual.

appear

before

the

magistrate

in

Richfield

was

Second, defendants argue that when Shields called

ahead to have a ••sniffer dog" ready to conduct a search of
defendants' vehicle, he detained the Beltrans longer than necessary
without probable cause in direct violation of United States v.
Walker. 751 F. Supp. 199

(D. Utah, C D .

1990), vacated and

remanded. 933 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1991), reh'a denied. 941 F.2d
1086 (10th Cir. 1991) and United States v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512
(10th Cir. 1988).

Third, defendants claim that the consent to

search the truck, given by defendant Jesus Beltran, was the product
of an illegal detention and therefore, under the totality of the
circumstances, was neither

informed nor voluntary.

Finally,

defendants argue that even if the consent was valid, entering the
truck with a "sniffer dog" exceeded the scope of the consent.
After careful consideration of the evidence, memoranda, argument of
counsel, and applicable law and for the reasons set forth below,
the court hereby GRANTS defendants' Motion To Suppress and ORDERS
that all the evidence seized from the November 20, 1991 search of
the defendants Jesus and Arturo Beltrans' truck is suppressed and,
therefore, inadmissible at trial.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On the morning of November 20, 1991, Shields was travelling
East on Interstate 70 in Sevier County, Utah.1

At approximately

7:25 a.m. Shields noticed a U-Haul truck traveling east on 1-70.
The vehicle passed him, pulled in front of him and then reduced in
speed.

After following the vehicle for a considerable distance,

Shields testified that the vehicle began weaving. Shields further
testified that the driving pattern caused him to believe that the
driver of the truck was either drowsy or otherwise impaired.
After observing the motion of the truck, Shields called the
dispatcher to determine whether the U-Haul's license plates were

!

Unless otherwise indicated, all facts are taken from the
transcript of the hearing on the Motion to Suppress. Because the
trial to which this matter related was scheduled to take place ten
days after the motion was heard, the Court did not have time to
obtain a certified transcript. All factual references, therefore,
must be cited to the transcript generally.
2

"wanted."

While waiting for a response, Shields continued to

follow the truck and continued to observe the driving pattern.
After receiving information from the dispatcher that the truck's
license plates were not "wanted," Shields pulled the U-Haul over.
Shields, through questioning the occupants of the vehicle, and
using his computer, determined that (1) The driver (Arturo) did not
have a driver's license; (2) The passenger (Jesus) has a valid
Colorado driver's license and a valid U- Haul rental contract made
out to him; (3) Neither defendant was listed as "wanted" by NCIC;
and (4) The occupants stated they were hauling a load of used
furniture from Los Angeles to Denver.
Shields then questioned Jesus and Arturo separately while
writing them separate citations for violations.

Shields cited

Arturo for driving without a license and gave a warning for
improper lane travel.

Additionally, Shields cited Jesus for

allowing an unlicensed driver to operate a vehicle. Both citations
were issued at 7:40 a.m. After issuing the citations, Shields kept
Jesus' license and the rental agreement,

and

instructed

the

Beltran's to follow him to the Magistrate in Richfield, Utah, where
they could post a bond to insure their appearance. While enroute,
Shields called ahead to arrange for a canine "drug-sniff" team to
meet him at the courthouse where he hoped to get consent to search
the U-Haul.
After both defendants had paid their fines and were proceeding
from the courthouse to the parking lot, Shields asked Jesus if he
had his rental agreement and his license.
3

He then told the

defendants that although they were free to go, he wanted to search
their vehicle.2

Jesus said he would consent and Shields produced

a written consent form which he had obtained from another Officer,
Sergeant Kevin Olsen, and asked Jesus if he would sign it.

Jesus

inquired what would happen if he didn't sign the form and following
conversation insued:
Jesus:

Where, if I don't sign there I can be free?

RO:

Yes.

Jesus:

You stop me further down the road?

RO:

No, no I won't.

Jesus:

Someone else will.

RO:

I don't think so.

Jesus:

(Couldn't hear)

RO:

Today's date is the 20th, that's the date I, have
here, then I'll have the other officer sign. I
seriously don't think (?) its' that bad.

Jesus:

You can see the truck, you can open and look at
furniture.

RO:

Well, this is what I've ask you to do, to open it
and look in there. I've ask you permission (?)
This just says I've talked to you and asked to do
that. (?)

See Exhibit 1 at 2.
After Jesus had signed the consent form, Shields motioned to
the dog handler to join him at his location.

Shields then

proceeded to open the truck's back door and let the dog into the
truck to conduct the search which resulted in the seizure of

2

A transcript of this conversation is attached as Exhibit 1,
4

sixteen (16) kilograms of cocaine which was secreted inside some of
the furniture.
ZZI.

A.

DZ8CU8QXQIX

THE CONTINUED DETENTION OP THE BELTRANS TO HAVE THEM POST A
BOND WAS A PRETEXT
Defendants argue that Shields' actions of keeping Jesus

Belt^an's driver's license and rental agreement, and escorting he
and his nephew into Richfield to see the Magistrate, constituted a
Pretext for his real purpose of searching the U-Haul.

The Court

agrees*
In United States v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988),
th e tJnited States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit delineated
th e correct standard to be applied when determining whether a stop
or other police action constitutes a pretext.

The court stated:

A pretextual stop occurs when the police use a legaljustification to make the stop i n order to search a
person or place, or to interrogate a person, for an
unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the
reasonable suspicion necessary t 0 support a stop. The
classic example, presented in this case, occurs when an
officer stops a driver for a min^r traffic violation in
order to investigate a hunch that the driver is engaged
in illegal drug activity.
Id* at 1515.
The court continued by stating that:
[A] court should ask 'not whether the officer could
validly have made the stop, but whether under the same
circumstances a reasonable officer would have made the
stop in the absence of the invalid purpose.' . • . In
other words, 'the proper basis of concern is not with why
the officer deviated from the usu^i practice in this case
but simply that he did deviate.'
Id. at 1517 (emphasis original) (citations omitted).

5

In the present case, Shields testified that it was not his
common practice to take out-of-state traffic offenders to a
magistrate to post a bond.

He further testified that at the time

he escorted the Beltrans to Richfield, he didn't think he had
sufficient probable cause to get a search warrant, but that he
nonetheless called ahead to arrange for a canine drug team to meet
him at the courthouse in Richfield.
The

government

argued

that

Shields

had

sufficient

justification for escorting the Beltrans to the Magistrate and that
the stop was not pretextual.

Shields testified that he escorted

the Beltrans to the magistrate because Sevier County was not his
normal patrol area and he did not have any mailing forms for the
Sevier County Court.

He further testified that Arturo had no

picture identification and, therefore, that he could not adequately
determine if Arturo was being truthful about his identity.

The

Court finds these arguments unpersuasive.
The Court finds it incredible that the mere fact that Shields
had no mailing slips for the Sevier County Court made it imperative
that the Beltrans be taken to see the magistrate.

The citations

given to the Beltrans clearly indicated the address to which the
fine should be sent and Shields had a record of Jesus' driver's
license

and

his

address

in Colorado.

Furthermore,

Shields

testified that he made no attempt to determine Arturo's identity
upon arriving at the magistrate's office. Truly, if Arturo's lack
of identification was a major factor in determining whether to let
the Beltrans proceed on their trip or to take them to the

6

magistrate, Shields should have made further inquiry or taken
further action regarding Arturo's identity. In any event, Shields
did nnt- have sufficient reason to compel the defendants to appear
before the magistrate at that time.3
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the trip to the
Magistrate's office was pretextual. Shields created the pretext in
order to allow the canine drug team sufficient time to get in place
so that Shields might expedite his premeditated search.

This

pretextual detention set in motion a series of events which
eventually led to the limited consent of Jesus Beltran to search
his vehicle.

Because the trip to the Magistrate was pretextual,

the consent and scope of the consent demands serious scrutiny.
3

Section 41-6-166 of the Utah Code provides in pertinent part,

(1) Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of
this act punishable as a misdemeanor, the arrested
person, for the purpose of setting bond, shall in the
following cases, be taken without unnecessary delay
before a magistrate within the county in which the
offense charged is alleged to have been committed and who
has jurisdiction of such offense and is nearest or most
accessible with reference to the place where said arrest
is made, in any of the following cases:
* * *

(d) In any other event when the person arrested
refuses to give his written promise to appear in court as
hereinafter provided, or when in the discretion of the
arresting officer, a written promise to appear is
insufficient.
Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-166 (1988).
There is no evidence in the record that Jesus or Arturo
Beltran refused to sign the document promising to appear.
Furthermore, for the reasons previously described, the Court finds
that there was insufficient justification to believe that a written
promise would be inadequate.
7

B.

ESCORTING THE BEL TRANS TO THE MAGISTRATE WAS AH IMPERMISSIBLE
DETENTION IN VIOLATION OF WALKER AND GUZMAN
As stated abovef the Court finds that the trip into the

Magistrate's office was a pretext in order to allow the drug-sniff
team to get into place* The Court further finds that the prolonged
detention which resulted from the pretextual trip into Richfield
was in direct violation of United States v, Walker. 751 F. Supp.
199 (D. Utah 1990), vacated and remanded. 933 F.2d 812 (10th Cir.
1991), reh'q denied. 941 F.2d 1086 (10th Cir. 1991) and United
States v, Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988).
The lesson of both Guzman and Walker is that a detained driver
who has produced proof that he is entitled to operate the vehicle
and who has a valid license should be given the citation for which
he was detained and sent on his way "without being subject to
further delay by police for additional questioning." Guzman. 864
F.2d at 1519.

In the case at bar, although Jesus had a valid

Colorado driver's license and although he possessed a valid rental
agreement, he and Arturo were detained and taken to the magistrate
in hopes that after they had appeared before the magistrate, they
might answer additional questions and consent to a search of their
vehicle.

As demonstrated below, Shields' own testimony supports

this finding.
Q.
So in other words, right after you pulled out from that
stop, you knew you were going to seek a consent to search, or
— or were in some manner trying to effect a search of that
truck, didn't you.
A.

Yes.
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Shields' testimony that he did not have enough evidence for a
warrant,

coupled

with

the

fact

that

when

he

detained

the

defendants, he knew he was going* to try to search the vehicle,
comes within the classic definition of a pretext outlined in Guzman
and cited in this opinion. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1515. The violation
of both Walker and Guzman provide further taint to the consent and
require the Court to closely examine the circumstances surrounding
the voluntary nature of the consent and its scope.
C.

THE CONSENSUAL ENCOUNTER DOCTRINE
The government argues that after Jesus and Arturo had paid

their fines and were free to go, a detention situation no longer
existed.

Thus, when Shields asked to search the vehicle, the

government contends, there was no violation of Guzman and Walker.
Indeed,

the

inapplicable.
The

government

argues

that

Guzman

and

Walker

are

The Court does not agree.

government

relies

on

the

police/citizen consensual encounter.

doctrine

known

as

the

Under this doctrine, if a

detention situation does not exist, the police are free to ask for
and receive consent to search a citizen's property even though the
officer has no probable cause to believe he will find illegal or
incriminating material.4
Although it can be argued that after defendants received their
property and paid their fines, a detention situation no longer

4

In arguing the police/citizen^ consensual encounter, the
government relies predominantly on the Tenth Circuit cases of
United States v. Werkinq. 915 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1990) and United
States v. Peases. 918 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1990).
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existed, the court believes that there is something fundamentally
different about the facts of this case and the facts of other cases
involving consensual encounters.
In United States v, Werkinq, 915 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1990),
the Tenth Circuit held that a seizure of marijuana from the
defendant's car did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the
defendant gave consent to the search in the context of a consensual
encounter.

In distinguishing Werkinq from Guzman, the Tenth

Circuit stated,
Guzman is different from this case. Before Dyer
asked Werking any further questions, he returned
Werking's driver's license and registration papers and
gave him the contact sheet.
The officer in Guzman.
however, did not return the defendant's license before
questioning him. The defendant legally could not proceed
on his way. He thus was seized within the meaning of the
fourth amendment. In the present case, however, Werking
was free to leave the scene. He chose to engage in a
consensual encounter with Dyer. We hold that Werking's
responses to Dyer's questions about transporting
narcotics, firearms, or large sums of money were the
voluntary cooperation of a private citizen with a law
enforcement official and were not obtained in violation
of the fourth amendment.
Werkinq, 915 F.2d at 1409.
Although the Beltrans' appearance before the magistrate and
the payment

of the tickets

technically

ended

the

detention

situation, the Court believes that there is something fundamentally
different about the police conduct in this case and the police
conduct in Werkinq. In Werkinq. the officer and the defendant were
out on the open road. The officer wrote out the ticket and gave it
to Mr. Werking telling him he was free to go.

At this point, he

asked a series of questions that the Tenth Circuit held formed the
10

basis of the consensual encounter.

In the case at bar the facts

are dissimilar.
After Shields had given the Beltrans their citations, he kept
both the rental agreement and Jesus' license. He then escorted the
Beltrans to the magistrates office knowing he had no probable cause
for a search warrant and intending to search the vehicle by getting
the owner's consent.

The pretextual detention led the defendants

to a location where Shields had arranged to meet the canine drugsniff team.

Shield's sole purpose in taking the defendants before

the magistrate was to detain them, get the team in place, obtain
the defendants' consent, and search the vehicle.

The Fourth

Amendment provides citizens with a shield against overly intrusive
action by law enforcement officials. A violation of a defendant's
rights can not be remedied simply by telling them they are free to
go and then asking for permission to search their property.
Although the conversation between Jesus Beltran and Shields may
technically be termed a consensual encounter, the only reason that
Shields was able to engage in that encounter was because he had
violated the defendants' rights in direct contravention of Guzman
and Walker.s
*The government also cites United States v. Peases, 918 F.2d
118 (10th Cir. 1990), cert, denied. Peases v. United States, 111
S.Ct. 2859 (1991) for the proposition that the consent obtained,
and the search conducted by Trooper Shields was legal. The facts
of Peases are similar to the facts of Werking. Peases was stopped
for a traffic violation. After the officer gave him a ticket,
returned his license, and told him he was free to go, he asked if
he might search the Peases' car. Peases consented. The officer
proceeded to search the car and seized one kilogram of cocaine.
Like the facts in Werking, the Court finds that the facts of
Peases are distinguishable for the reasons stated in the opinion.
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D.

CONSENT
The Tenth Circuit has held that when the defendant consents to

a search following a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights , "the
consent is valid only if it is voluntary in fact, A determination
whether a particular consent is voluntary in fact is made by
examining
consent."

the

totality

Guzman,

of the

864

circumstances

F.2d

at

1520

surrounding

(citations

the

omitted).

Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has stated that if a
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated, the voluntariness
of the confession must be "sufficiently an act of free will to
purge the primary taint." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602
(1975) (quoting Wong Su v. United States. 371 U.S. 471, 486
(1963)) .
After

a

circumstances,

careful
the

examination

Court

of

finds that

the
the

totality

of

the

Shields' disclosure

concerning the nature and scope of the search was insufficient to
allow Jesus to make a informed, voluntary decision as to whether to
allow or disallow the search.

Shields knew from the moment he

asked the Beltrans to accompany him to Richfield that he wanted to
search the truck for drugs. Indeed, he testified that he believed
a dog-sniff team would be available to him because at that time he
was engaging in a drug interdiction program called the Span 70
Project.

Acting on that belief, Shields had a canine drug-sniff

dog waiting at the courthouse when the Beltrans arrived and called
other officers in order to get the written consent form.
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Jesus,

however, knew nothing of the drug-sniff team and from his comments
obviously did not understand the nature nor scope of Shields
intended search.
If Shields wanted proper and truly voluntary consent to search
the truck, he should have
following:

informed the Beltrans

as to the

(1) The materials for which he was searching; (2) The

method to be employed, i.e.,

use of a drug-sniff dog; (3) The scope

of the search; and (4) The specific consequences that would result
if illegal substances were found.

Shields failed to inform the

Beltrans in this manner and# therefore, the court finds that Jesus
was not fully informed as to the nature of the and scope of the
search.

Consequently, Jesus' consent was not fully informed and

not truly voluntary.
E.

SCOPE OF THE SEARCH
The Tenth Circuit has held that "[tjhe scope of a consent

search is limited by the breadth of the actual consent itself.11
United States v. Gav, 774 F.2d 368# 377 (1985).
police

transcript

of

the

conversation

In this case, the

regarding

consent

memorializes the intended scope of the search to which Jesus
consented. Even assuming disclosure by Shields when specifying the
scope of his purported consent, Jesus stated, w[y]ou can see the
truck, you can open and look at furniture." See Exhibit 1 at 2.
Shields then confirmed the scope of the search when he stated,
"Well, this is what I've ask you to do, to open it and look in
there. I've ask your permission (?) This just says I've talked to
you and asked to do that. (?)" Id.
13

Even assuming disclosure by Shields, the scope of Jesus'
consent was to allow the officers to open the truck and look at the
furniture. Shields never informed the Jesus that he would be using
drug-sniff dog.

Nor is it clear that Jesus' consent would allow

the officer to enter the truck or handle the furniture. The Court
finds, therefore, that even assuming disclosure by Shields, the
scope of the search was exceeded when drug-sniff dog entered the
truck and conducted a search.

Accordingly, this evidence, which

was obtained in violation of the defendants' Fourth Amendment
rights, must be suppressed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Shields' pretextual and unlawful detention of the Beltrans set
in motion a series of events which led to the illegal search of the
Beltrans' truck. Because Shields unlawfully detained the Beltrans
in violation of Walker and Guzman, the defendants' Fourth Amendment
rights were violated and, therefore, their consent would be valid
only if voluntary in fact.

Looking at the totality of the

circumstances, the Court finds that the defendants' consent was
neither informed nor voluntary.

The Court also finds that the

officer

the

exceeded

therefore,

the

scope

that the evidence

of

involuntary

obtained

as

search

a result must

suppressed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated, this 30th day of^January, 1992.
rutse* S. Jenkins* Chief Judge
United State/ District Court
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and,
be

EXHIBIT 1

/Z3

November 20, 1991 - Conversation between Trooper C. Dean Shields,
(RO) and Jesus Humbero Beltran (Jesus)
RO:

I will be looking for contraband or other illegal items.
If we do find those items we will be seizing them and
taking other action. At this point you are free to go.
I'd like to look inside your van though. I'd like to
receive a consent to search on your vehicle. Will you
consent to that search?

Jesus:

Yes.

RO:

Let me have
name••••

Jesus:

Humbero

RO:

And Beltran and where you reside at—the address on the
citation. Do you reside at 333 Lincoln?

Jesus:

No, 340 So

RO:

What's that?

Jesus:

340 South Clay, that's Denver

RO:

In Denver, Colorado?

Jesus:

Yes.

RO:

Do you have a telephone number there?

Jesus:

Yes, Sir, 922-5169

RO:

922 What?

Jesus:

922-5169

RO:

I'm Trooper Shields

Jesus:

Who?

RO:

I'm Trooper Shields and I may have other officers
assisting in the search here, Ah, in the U-Haul truck
that you rented, your the only one on the rental contract
there. What model is that F-350?

Olson:

350.

RO:

(Couldn't hear tape)

you

sign

right

here.

Put

your

middle

I authorize said officer!s) to remove from my vehicle,
residence, and/or other property any documents or items
deemed
pertinent
to any
investigation,
with
the

Page 2
understanding that the officer will furnish a receipt for
whatever is removed.
I am giving this written permission to these officers
freely and voluntarily, without any threats or promises.
If you agree with that, let me have you sign right there.
Jesus:

Where, if I don't sign there I can be free?

RO:

Yes.

Jesus:

You stop me further down the road?

RO:

No, no I won't.

Jesus:

Someone else will.

RO:

I don't think so.

Jesus:

(Couldn't hear)

RO:

Today's date is the 20th, that's the date I have here,
then I'll have the other officer sign. I seriously don't
think (?) it's that bad.

Jesus:

You can see
furniture.

RO:

Well, this is what I've ask you to do, to open it and
look in there. I've ask your permission (?) This just
says I've talked to you and asked to do that. (?)

Jesus:

Is it 9:22?

RO:

It's 9:20.

the

truck,

you can

open

Conversation between Sergeant Kevin Olson (Olson)
(Arturo) and Jesus Beltran (Jesus)
Olson:

Where you guys headed to?

Arturo:

Denver

Olson:

Where do you live, Denver?

Arturo:

California

Olson:

You live in California.

and

look

at

Arturo Beltran

Are you moving to Denver?

